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COMMENT
THE STEVEDORE'S DUTY TO INDEMNIFY
SHIPOWNERS FOR INJURIES TO
LONGSHOREMEN-EMPLOYEES
By

LAURENCE

L.

PILLSBURY*

In this sometime weird Ryan-Yaka world, there is only one thing
certain: no stevedore in his right mind wants, or encourages, a suit by
an injured employee against a third party vessel or vessel owner....
For the filing of the third party suit precipitates a three-cornered Kilkenny Fair in which all lash out against the other, and in the end it
is so often the case of the injured worker winning, and the impleadedstevedore-employer losing as a result of an injury that some thought
was exclusively covered under the Longshoremen's Act.'
W ORKMEN'S compensation statutes are today the principal instruments for compensating workers for their occupational injuries and
at the same time distributing the cost to the industry.2 When the employer complies with the statutory requirements, the compensation
statutes ordinarily provide the employee's exclusive remedy against
his employer.3 Yet in almost all jurisdictions the worker's rights against
third-parties are preserved.4 In situations where a third-party is solely
at fault, the problems are relatively simple. However, where the thirdparty and the employer are concurrently at fault, the compensation
statutes have generated some troublesome problems in the area of
contribution and indemnity. These problems present what a leading
authority has described as "perhaps the most evenly-balanced controversy in all of compensation law."5
The volume of maritime litigation over this controversy between
third-parties and employers greatly exceeds that of any other jurisdiction. This comment will examine that maritime litigation with particular emphasis on the rationale underlying the third-party's indemnity
action. The controversy can best be examined after a survey of the
*Member, Third Year Class.
1
Brown, J., dissenting in Strachan Shipping Co. v. Melvin, 327 F.2d 83, 90 (5th
Cir. 1964).
2 See generally LAwSON, WOMKMEN'S COMPENSATION (2 volumes, 1958, 1961).
3 2 LARsoN, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATiON §§ 65-67 (1961).
aId. §§ 71-73.

5 Id. § 76.10 at 228.
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employee's maritime action against third-parties. Part I of this comment is therefore devoted to a brief survey of the nature and sweep
of that action. Part II is devoted to the indemnity action proper. Part
III is devoted to a rather extraordinary maritime development under
which the employee is allowed to sue his employer directly if his employer is a shipowner. This anomaly of maritime law appears to have
washed in largely in the wake of the indemnity action.
The usual case develops after a shipboard injury to a longshoreman. The longshoreman is a harbor worker whose job is to load and
unload ships. Ordinarily he is employed by a stevedoring company,
which is in turn engaged as an independent contractor by the shipowner to perform the ship's stevedoring operations. The longshoreman, unlike the interstate railway worker 6 and the full-fledged seaman, 7
is covered by a scheme of workmen's compensation-The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act." The stevedoring
company (hereafter called the stevedore) is, for purposes of the Act,
the longshoreman's employei. In compensation language, the shipowner is a third-party, except in the occasional case where the shipowner himself hires the longshoreman.
I. THE LONGSHOREMAN'S ACTION FOR
UNSEAWORTEIINESS
The longshoreman's action against the shipowner generally couples
a negligence count with a count alleging that the ship was unseaworthy
under the doctrine of Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki.9 The latter, as we
shall see, is essentially a doctrine of liability without fault. The longshoreman can bring his action in several forums. He can maintain
the action on the admiralty side of the federal courts either as a libel
in rem against the ship or as a libel in personam against the shipowner.1°
If diversity of citizenship requirements are met, he can sue the ship2
owner on the law side of the federal courts'1 and obtain a jury trial.'
6 The Federal Employers' Liability Act, 35 Stat. 65 (1908), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60
(1958), gives the interstate railway employee an action against his employer at law
for damages.
7The Jones Act, 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1958), extends the
F.E.L.A. remedy to seamen. See generally GImmoRE & Bi.Acx, AnmuiaRAy 279-315
(1957).
844 Stat. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1958).
9 328 U.S. 85 (1946). The longshoreman need not elect between unseaworthiness
and negligence. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 413-14 (1953); Lahde v.
Soc. Armadora Del Norte, 220 F.2d 357, 361 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 825

(1955).
1o Lahde v. Soc. Armadora Del Norte, supra note 9 at 360. See generally Gl.moRE
& BLAcK, AmniLTY 18-28, 251-52, 514-15 (1957).
11 Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 359-80 (1959).
12 Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores v. Ellerman Lines, 369 U.S. 355, 360 (1962); Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. Nacirema Operating Co., 355 U.S. 563 (1958).
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He can also bring the action in the state courts.'3 In any forum substantive maritime law applies. 14 Under that law assumption of risk is
not a defense, 15 and contributory negligence operates to mitigate the
recovery, but not to bar it.'0
The longshoreman's unseaworthiness claim ordinarily can be maintained whenever his injury is attributable to ship's equipment or ap-7
purtenances which are not reasonably fit for their intended purpose.'
As a remedy for longshoremen, unseaworthiness had its origin as
recently as 1946 in Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki.'8 Sieracki, the longshoreman, was injured while loading the ship when a shackle supporting a boom broke due to a latent defect. In the trial court, Sieracki
recovered judgments for negligence against Bethlehem Steel Company,
the builder of the ship, and against a subcontractor of Bethlehem; but
recovery against the shipowner was denied on the ground that the
shipowner owed no duty to Sieracki to inspect for latent defects.' 9
In the court of appeals, the judgment in favor of the shipowner was
reversed. The court did not disagree with the trial court's conclusion
that the shipowner was free of negligence, but granted Sieracki judgment on the ground that the ship was unseaworthy. 20 The Supreme
Court agreed. Regarding the law settled that a seaman could recover
for unseaworthiness without proof of fault,21 the Court treated the
controversy as turning on whether the longshoreman was entitled to
the seaman's remedy. The Court concluded that he was.
The decision rested largely on the Court's finding that loading and
unloading was historically the work of the ship's crew. In short, the
longshoreman was entitled to the seaman's remedy because he was
13 Caldarola v. Eckert, 332 U.S. 155, 157-58 (1947); Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S.
Co., 247 U.S. 372 (1918); Steamboat Co. v. Chase, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 522 (1872).
14 Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale, 358 U.S. 625 (1959); Pope & Talbot, Inc. v.
Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 409 (1953); Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
An exception to the rule applies to deaths within state territorial waters. Goett v. Union
Carbide Corp., 361 U.S. 340 (1960); The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959);
Steamboat Co. v. Chase, supra note 13.
'5 Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1939); The Arizona v.
Anelich, 298 U.S. 110 (1936).
16, Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale, 358 U.S. 625, 629 (1959); Pope & Talbot,
Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 408 (1953); The Max Morris, 137 U.S. 1 (1890).
17 See generally GI2oaE & BLACK, AimtLa-TY 315-32 (1957).
Is 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
19 57 F. Supp. 724 (E.D. Pa. 1944).
20 149 F.2d 98 (3d Cir. 1945).
21 The shipowner apparently conceded the point. In fact, the proposition that a
seaman could recover for unseaworthiness without proof of fault was far from settled.
See the historical studies in Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, 362 U.S. 539, 555-70 (1960)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Shields & Byrne, Application of the "Unseaworthines"
Doctrine to Longshoremen, 111 U. PA. L. Rzv. 1137, 1139-47 (1963); Tetreault, Seamen,
Seaworthiness, and the Rights of HarborWorkers, 39 ComsRNL L.Q. 381 (1954).

May, 1964]

COMMENT

"doing a seaman's work and incurring a seaman's hazards."2 2 The

Court also suggested that it was sound social engineering to require the
shipowner, who was in a position to distribute the loss in the shipping
23
community, to bear the loss as part of the cost of stevedoring services.
24
The decision has been more than lightly criticized. Recent scholarship, for example, has convincingly demonstrated that the Court's
history was unsound by showing that only on rare occasions did seamen
of the past load or unload their ships. 25 Moreover, even if the Court's
historical notions are accepted, there remains a vast difference between
the longshoreman and the seaman of the modem day. As the dissent
pointed out, longshoremen
unlike members of the crew of a vessel ... do not go to sea; they are

not subject to the rigid discipline of the sea; they are not prevented
by law or ship's discipline from leaving the vessel on which they may
be employed; they have the same recourse 2as land workers to avoid
6
the hazards to which they are exposed ....
And for efficient distribution of the risk of loss, the dissent pointed out
that Congress had provided
the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
27
Compensation Act.

Despite the criticism of Sieracki, the doctrine of strict liability to
the longshoreman for unseaworthiness has been carried to all corners
of the law of shipboard injuries. All manner of things and conditions
in and about the ship have been held to render it unseaworthy.28
Cases of defective ship's loading gear,29 defective ladders,30 unsecured beams 31 and defective hand tools 32 have been commonplace.

22 328 U.S. at 99.
231d. at 93-94, 96.
24nAmbler, Seaman Are "Wards of Admiralty" But Longshoremen Are Now More
Privileged,29 WAsH. L. RBv. 243, 257-58 (1954); Shields & Byrne, supra note 21; Tetreault, supra note 21.
25 Shields & Byrne, supra note 21, at 1139-47; Tetreault, supra note 21, at 413-14.
26 328 U.S. at 105.
27 Id. at 107-08.

See generally Annots., 90 A.L.R.2d 710 (1963); 77 A.L.R.2d 829 (1961).
E.g., Crunady v. The Joachim Hendrik Fisser, 358 U.S. 423 (1959); Caldarola
v. Eckert, 332 U.S. 155 (1947); United States v. Rothschild Int'l Stevedoring Co., 183
F.2d 30181 (9th Cir. 1950).
E.g., Czaplicki v. The S.S. Hoegh Silvercloud, 351 U.S. 525 (1956); Ferrigno v.
Ocean Transport, Ltd., 309 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1962); Smith v. Jugosalvenska Linijska
Plovidea, 278 F.2d 176 (4th Cir. 1960).
3
1 E.g., Porello v. United States, 153 F.2d 605 (2d Cir. 1946), reo'd and remanded
on other grounds sub nom. American Stevedores, Inc. v. Porello, 330 U.S. 446 (1947);
Hugev v. Dampskisaktieselskabet Int'l, 170 F. Supp. 601 (S.D. Cal. 1959), aff'd sub nom.
Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. Dampskisaktieselskabet, 274 F.2d 875 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 363 U.S. 803 (1960).
32
E.g., Michalic v. Cleveland Tankers, Inc., 364 U.S. 325 (1960); Calmar S.S.
Corp. v. Nacirema Operating Co., 266 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S.
816 (1960).
28

29
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Improper loading or unloading of cargo which creates a hazardous
condition renders a ship unseaworthy. 3 Defective conditions under
foot such as slippery decks can constitute unseaworthiness a 4 In a recent
extreme case, 85 a skylarking harbor worker tripped over a random plank
of wood on top of a hatch, and, though the harbor worker was deemed
fifty per cent negligent, the court held the ship unseaworthy. The trial
court found that the unaccounted-for presence of the plank "created
a danger not integral to the necessary operations of the ship" and thus
the ship was "less than reasonably fit for its intended use." 8 Even
the crew must be "equal in disposition... to the ordinary men in the
calling."37 Thus, victims of shipboard assaults by unduly bellicose crew-

men have recovered for unseaworthiness. 88
Dockside injuries are not beyond the ambit of this so-called "humanitarian policy" if the injury can still be attributed to the ship or
its cargo. Thus, in Strika v. Netherlands Ministry of Traffic,3 9 a longshoreman injured on the dock by defective ship's loading tackle was
allowed recovery. And in the recent case of Gutierrez v. Waterman
S.S. Corp., 40 a longshoreman on the dock slipped on some beans which
had spilled from defective bags during unloading. The Supreme Court
held that the bean bags were unseaworthy 41 and that the Sieracki doctrine applied even though the injury occurred on the dock.
33 Strachan Shipping Co. v. Alexander, 311 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1962); Amador v.
A/S J. Ludwig Mowinckels Rederi, 224 F.2d 437 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 901
(1955); Gindville v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 224 F.2d 746 (3d Cir. 1955); Palazzolo v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 211 F.2d 277 (2d Cir. 1954), aff'd mem. sub nor. Ryan
Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 349 U.S. 901 (1955), aff'd on rehearing,350
U.S. 124 (1956); Holley v. The Manfred Stansfield, 186 F. Supp. 212 (E.D. Va. 1960).
34 Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, 362 U.S. 539 (1960); Ktistakis v. United Cross Nav.
Corp., 316 F.2d 869 (2d Cir. 1963); Orlando v. Prudential S.S. Corp., 214 F. Supp. 116
(S.D.N.Y. 1962); De Palma v. South African Marine Corp., 206 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y.
1962). However, the fact finders may conclude that the ship is nevertheless fit for its
intended use. Pinto v. States Marine Corp., 296 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369
U.S. 843 (1962); Bleir v. United States Lines, 286 F.2d 920 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 836 (1961).
35 Shenker v. United States, 322 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 32 U.S.L.
WEEx 3289 (U.S. Feb. 17, 1964).
36 Id. at 626 (the court of appeals summarizing the trial court's findings).
37 Keen v. Overseas Tankship Corp., 194 F.2d 515, 518 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343
U.S. 966 (1952).
38Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 348 U.S. 336 (1955); Horton v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 326 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1964); Keen v. Overseas Tankship Corp., supra note
37.
39 185 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 904 (1951). But a longshoreman injured aboard ship by a defective shoreside crane cannot recover for unseaworthiness. Huff v. Matson Nav. Co., 225 F. Supp. 72 (N.D. Cal. 1963); McKnight v.
N. M. Paterson & Sons, 181 F. Supp. 434 (N.D. Ohio), aff'd, 286 F.2d 250 (6th Cir.
1960), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 913 (1961).
40373 U.S. 206 (1963).
41 "A ship that leaks is unseaworthy; so is a cargo container that leaks." Id. at 213.
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It is immaterial that the hazardous conditions are created by noncrew-members, even though they are negligent. Defective cargo containers, for example, have been held to make a ship unseaworthy,
42
though the containers are supplied by the consignor of the cargo.
Hazards arising from improper loading or unloading of cargo make the
ship unseaworthy, though the conditions are created by negligent fellow servants of the injured longshoreman. 43 Even defective equipment
brought44aboard temporarily by the stevedore renders the ship unseaworthy.

Moreover, it is now immaterial that the hazardous condition is only
transitory. For a time it was thought that transitory conditions, such
as temporarily slippery decks, were not within Sieracki's full sweep.
The suggestion was that a ship was less than seaworthy if a deck stood
greasy for a long period of time, but not if the same amount of grease
had been freshly spilled. In cases falling into the transitory class, it
was thought that constructive notice to the ship's officers or appropriate members of the crew was a necessary condition of recovery.45 This
limitation on Sieracki, however, was struck down in the recent case of
42 Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 373 U.S. 206 (1963); Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines, 369 U.S. 355 (1962).
41 Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944); Johnson Line v. Maloney,
243 F.2d 293 (9th Cir. 1957) (by implication); Grillea v. United States, 232 F.2d 919
(2d Cir. 1956); Palazzolo v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 211 F.2d 277 (2d Cir. 1954), aff'd
memo. sub nom.Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 349 U.S. 901 (1955),
aff'd on rehearing,350 U.S. 124 (1956).
In Holley v. The Manfred Stansfield, 186 F. Supp. 212 (E.D. Va. 1960), a wrongful
death action, a recovery for unseaworthiness was allowed, reduced by 50% for "contributory negligence," though the unseaworthy condition was created and triggered solely
by the decedent himself. Similarly, in Donovan v. Esso Shipping Co., 259 F.2d 65 (3d
Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 907 (1959), a ship was held unseaworthy due to conditions created and triggered solely by the plaintiff, but recovery was denied on a theory
of 100% "contributory negligence." In Holmes v. Mississippi Shipping Co., 301 F.2d
474 (5th Cir.), petition for cert. dismissed per stipulation, 371 U.S. 802 (1962), a seaman, who cut off his hand with three strokes of a meat cleaver during a schizophrenic
fit, sought to recover from the shipowner for unseaworthiness on the theory that the
plaintiff-seaman was not equal in disposition to the ordinary man in the calling. The
court, conceding that he might recover if a fellow seaman had severed the hand, denied
recovery on rather unclear rationale. The same court has held that suicide resulting from
insanity is not wilful misconduct so as to fall within the statutory exception to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. Voris v. Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n,
190 F.2d 929 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 932 (1952).
44
Alaska S.S. Co. v. Petterson, 347 U.S. 396 (1954), affirming per curiam 205 F.2d
478 (9th Cir. 1953); Rogers v. United States Lines, 347 U.S. 984 (1954), reversing
mem. 205 F.2d 57 (3d Cir. 1953); Litwinowicz v. Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co., 179 F. Supp.
812 (E.D. Pa. 1959); Di Salvo v. Cunard S.S. Co., 171 F. Supp. 813 (S.D.N.Y. 1959);
De Van v. Pennsylvania R.R., 167 F. Supp. 336 (E.D. Pa. 1958); Considine v. Black
Diamond S.S. Corp., 163 F. Supp. 107 (D. Mass. 1958).
45See Cookingham v. United States, 184 F.2d 213 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340
U.S. 935 (1951).
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Mitchell v. Trawler Racer.4 6 In that case a seaman was injured as he
attempted to step over the ship's rail to the dock. He slipped on slime
which had apparently remained from earlier in the day when fish and
spawn had been unloaded across the rail. The trial court treated the
matter as a case of transitory unseaworthiness and incorporated a concept of constructive notice into its charge to the jury. The Supreme
Court held the instruction erroneous.
There is no suggestion in any of the decisions that the duty is less
onerous with respect to. . . an unseaworthy condition which may be
only temporary. Of particular relevance here is Alaska S.S. Co. v.
Petterson.... In that case the Court affirmed a judgment holding the
shipowner liable for injuries caused by defective equipment temporarily brought on board by an independent contractor over which the
owner had no control. That decision is thus specific authority for the
proposition that the shipowner's actual or constructive knowledge of
the unseaworthy condition is not essential to his liabilty. That decision also effectively disposes of the suggestion that liability for a temporary unseaworthy condition is different 7 from the liability that
attaches when the condition is permanent.
This brief examination of a few of the innumerable progeny of
Sieracki should sufficiently demonstrate that the shipowner's liability
for longshoremen's injuries is not only sans fault but is extremely broad
in sweep. In short, virtually any defect in equipment or any unusual
condition, even a stray block of wood or a leaky bean bag, can render
a ship unseaworthy. Moreover, as we have seen, it matters not that
the condition is only temporary or that it is created by someone other
than a member of the ship's crew.
II. THE SHIPOWNER'S INDEMNITY ACTION
The shipowner's indemnity action developed somewhat later than
the longshoreman's unseaworthiness claim. Not until the 1956 case of
Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp.48 did the shipowner
become certain that he was to have some assistance in insuring that
injured longshoremen would have an adequate award outside the Compensation Act. In that landmark decision the Supreme Court held that
in certain factual situations the shipowner could obtain indemnity from
the stevedore on the basis of an implied-in-fact promise to render workmanlike service. That decision will be examined closely after a brief
look at the Ryan background. The pre-Ryan decisions in the Supreme
Court actually suggested that stevedores as well as longshoremen were
to be the darlings of the law of admiralty.
46 362 U.S. 539, 549-50 (1960).

4 Ibid.

4s350 U.S. 124 (1956).
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1. The Ryan Background
In 1952 the Supreme Court took the case of Halcyon Lines v. Haenn

Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp.49 A harbor worker who had suffered

injuries aboard ship brought the action against the shipowner for negli-

gence and unseaworthiness. The shipowner brought in Haenn, an
independent contractor who employed the injured harbor worker, al-

leging that Haenn's negligence had contributed to the injury and praying that contribution be awarded. By stipulation a judgment was

rendered in favor of the harbor worker. In the third-party action the
jury returned a special verdict that the shipowner was twenty-five per
cent and Haenn seventy-five per cent responsible. The district judge,
however, decided there was a general maritime rule requiring that
damages be equally divided between the two parties. 50 The court of
appeals agreed that contribution should be allowed, but held that it

could not exceed Haenn's liability under the Longshoremen's Compensation Act. 51
The Supreme Court decided the matter in a fashion which the
shipowner could hardly have anticipated. After acknowledging the
ancient maritime rule of divided damages in mutual-fault collision
cases, and that courts exercising maritime jurisdiction traditionally

have fashioned rules with greater freedom than common law courts,
the Court concluded that "it would be unwise to attempt to fashion
new judicial rules of contribution and that the solution of this problem should await congressional action."5 2 The Court expressly declined

to decide whether section 5 of the Longshoremen's Act 53 (the employer's exclusive liability provision) barred contribution. 4 Under the

Court's disposition, the contribution action was dismissed and the shipowner, who was only twenty-five per cent negligent, was sent home
strapped with the stevedore's negligence as well as his own.55
49342 U.S. 282 (1952).

50 Baccile v. Halcyon Lines, 89 F. Supp. 765 (E.D. Pa. 1950).
51 Baccile v. Halcyon Lines, 187 F.2d 403 (3d Cir. 1951).
52 342 U.S. at 285.
r3 The liability of an employer... [for compensation] shall be exclusive and in
place of all other liability of such employer to the employee, his legal representative, husband or wife, parents, dependents, next of kin, and anyone otherwise
entitled to recover damages from such employer at law or in admiralty on account of such injury or death ....
44 Stat. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1958) (emphasis added).
54 The pre-Halcyon cases were sharply divided as to whether § 5 or the general
policy of the Act barred contribution, but none had seriously suggested that the common
law rule of non-contribution applied in the admiralty. The cases are collected and discussed in Weinstock, The Employer's Duty to Indemnify Shipowners for Damages Recovered by Harbor Workers, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 321, 323-28 (1954).
55 Compare Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 597 (1963), a case
of mutual-fault collision between a private ship and a government dredge. An injured
government employee, covered by the Federal Employees' Compensation Act, sued the
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The shipowner's next defeat in the Supreme Court came less than
two years later in Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn.56 Hawn, a carpenter
who was temporarily aboard ship to repair grain-loading equipment,
was injured due to the unseaworthiness of the ship along with the
concurring negligence of both the shipowner and Hawn's employer
(an independent contractor). By the time judgment was entered in
Hawn's favor against the shipowner, he had received about 5,000 dollars in compensation payments from his employer,57 for loss of wages
and medical expenses. Hawn had agreed to reimburse his employer
from the recovery.58 The shipowner, pointing out that the verdict
against him included these very items, contended that the judgment
should be reduced pro tanto. He argued that to allow Hawn to keep
that amount would constitute a double recovery, and to allow Hawn's
employer to recoup his payments from the recovery would give an
unconscionable reward to an employer whose negligence contributed
to the injury. The Supreme Court disposed of the argument in three
sentences:
A weakness in this ingenious argument is that section 33 of the
[Longshoremen's] Act has specific provisions to permit an employer to
recoup his compensation payment out of any recovery from a third
person negligently causing such injuries. Pope &Talbot's contention
if accepted would frustrate this purpose to protect employers who are
subjected to absolute liability by the Act. Moreover, reduction of
Pope & Talbot's liability at the expense of... [the employer] would
be the substantial equivalent of contribution which we declined to
require in the Halcyon case.59
This is a rather summary disposition of an important question
which might well have been decided the other way. First, the stevedore's right to reimbursement when the longshoreman prosecutes the
action is not provided for in the Longshoremen's Act. The provisions
of the Act cover only the situation where the claim has been assigned
private shipowner and recovered $16,000. Under the settled admiralty rule in mutual-fault
collision cases each shipowner is entitled to recover from the other one-half his damages.
The government objected to the private shipowner's including the $16,000 in his total
damages. The Court held in favor of the shipowner, saying that § 7(b) of the Federal
Employees' Act, which is almost identical to § 5 of the Longshoremen's Act, did not qualify the ancient admiralty rule of divided damages in mutual-fault collision cases.
56 346 U.S. 406 (1953).
57 Section 14(a) of the Longshoremen's Act requires the employer, unless he controverts his liability, to make payments to the injured employee without a formal award.
Acceptance of compensation paid without a formal award does not prejudice the employee's right of action against the third party, although payments pursuant to a formal
award5 can have that effect. See note 60 infra.
8 The agreement appears to be immaterial. The Etna, 138 F.2d 37 (3d Cir. 1943),
held that even in the absence of agreement the employer was entitled to reimbursement
on equitable principles. The employer, however, was not negligent in that case.
59 346 U.S. at 412.
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to the stevedore by operation of the Act.6 0 When the longshoreman
himself sues the third-party tortfeasor, reimbursement has been al-

lowed by the courts solely on equitable principles.6 1

Second, conceding arguendo that the result should not depend on
who prosecutes the action, there is no indication in the statutory re-

coupment provisions that they were intended to apply when the stevedore is concurrently negligent with the third party. It is far more likely
that Congress contemplated the simple situation where the third party's
negligence is the sole cause of the injury. If Congress had contemplated
cases of concurrent fault, the monsoons of litigation over contribution
and indemnity would have been avoided by specific statutory enactment.

Third, while the stevedore's liability under the Act is absolute, he
deserves no judicial sympathy in this situation. The shipowner's liability for unseaworthiness is just as absolute, and the shipowner does
not have the benefit of limited damages.
Fourth, allowing the shipowner a pro tanto defense would not be
at odds with a rule of non-contribution. On the contrary, the two rules

ordinarily complement each other. The obvious and inevitable result
of a strict application of the rule of non-contribution is that neither
wrongdoer is allowed to shift any part of his loss to the other. And
to avoid double recovery, whenever the injured party recovers part of
his loss from one wrongdoer, whether by settlement or under a judgment, his recovery against the other is reduced pro tanto.62 Under the
decision in Pope & Talbot, not only was Hawn's recovery not reduced

pro tanto, but the negligent employer was allowed to shift his full loss
to the shipowner. Pope & Talbot is not a mere aflrmance of the noncontribution rule of Halcyon. The net result of this decision is that the
60 Section 33(b) of the Act at the time of the Pope & Talbot case provided for immediate and automatic assignment of the employee's cause of action upon acceptance
by the employee of compensation under a formal award. 44 Stat. 1440 (1927), as
amended, 52 Stat. 1168 (1938). Currently § 33(b) provides for an assignment unless
the employee institutes proceedings against a third-party within six months after accepting compensation under a formal award. 44 Stat. 1440 (1927), as amended, 52 Stat.
1168 (1938), as amended, 73 Stat. 391 (1959), 33 U.S.C. § 933 (Supp. III, 1962).
However, § 14(a) of the Act provides that "compensation shall be paid... without an
award, except where liability is controverted by the employer." 44 Stat. 1432 (1927),
33 U.S.C. § 914(a). Section 33(e) provides for reimbursement of the employer in the
situation where the claim is prosecuted or compromised by the employer after an assignment. After deduction of the employer's legal expenses, compensation paid, and compensation thereafter payable, four-fifths of the balance is payable to the employee. 44
Stat. 1440 (1927), as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 9 33(e) (Supp. III, 1962). There is no provision for reimbursement of the employer when the employee prosecutes the claim.
61 The Etna, 138 F.2d 37 (3d Cir. 1943), supra note 58.
62 Under the older rule, settlement or partial satisfaction from one tortfeasor often
completely released the others, but there is no authority for allowing a double recovery.
See Annots., 50 A.L.R. 1057 (1927); 27 A.L.R. 805 (1923), supplemented by 65 A.L.R.
1087 (1930).
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rule of non-contribution applies only against the shipowner and not
against the stevedore. While the negligent shipowner is allowed neither

contribution nor a pro tanto defense, the negligent stevedore is awarded
full indemnity. 63
After Halcyon and Pope & Talbot, all the shipowner had left was
a right to indemnity in certain factual situations, and even this had
not been approved by the Supreme Court. Shortly after Halcyon, it
was argued in the lower courts that allowance of indemnity could not

be squared with Halcyon's rule of non-contribution, but the lower

courts refused to read that case broadly. 64 In situations where the shipowner was allowed indemnity prior to Halcyon, the lower courts continued to allow it.65 The supporting rationale was, however, uncertain.
When the shipowner and stevedore had a contract with express indemnity provisions squarely covering the injury, there was of course
no difficulty. But in the absence of such provisions, the decisions frequently revealed a blending together of distinct principles in one rather

bewildering potpourri.
One can extract from these pre-Ryan cases essentially two basic
and distinct rationales: 66 (1) genuine implied-in-fact contract, and
(2) quasi-contract. r Indemnity on the basis of genuine contract prin63 Compare W/itt v. Jackson, 57 Cal. 2d 57, 17 Cal. Rptr. 369, 360 P.2d 641 (1961)
(Traynor, J.). The California Supreme Court, in a similar case under the California
Workmen's Compensation Act, allowed the third-party tortfeasor a pro tanto defense on
the theory that the negligent employer should not profit from his own wrong.
64 Crawford v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 206 F.2d 784 (3d Cir. 1953); States S.S. Co.
v. Rothschild Int'l Stevedoring Co., 205 F.2d 253 (9th Cir. 1953).
65
E.g., Brown v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 211 F.2d 16 (3d Cir. 1954); Crawford v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., supra note 64; States S.S. Co. v. Rothschild Int'l Stevedoring
Co., supra note 64; Read v. United States, 201 F.2d 758 (3d Cir. 1953).
66 An additional theory, common law negligence, appears in a few cases, but has
proved to be of little importance. The most notable example is States S.S. Co. v. Rothschild Int'l Stevedoring Co., 205 F.2d 253, 256 (9th Cir. 1953). See also Considine v.
Black Diamond S.S. Corp., 163 F. Supp. 107 (D. Mass. 1958).
7A
considerable amount of the confusion that exists in the cases could be avoided
if the distinction between the genuine contract and the quasi-contract were carefully
observed. One scholar has remarked:
The persistent failure to recognize... [the distinction between contracts proper
and quasi contracts (or contracts implied in law)], however, has resulted in
confusion and error, and in many cases has wrought serious injustice. It cannot
be too strongly emphasized, therefore, that quasi contracts are in no sense genuine contracts. The contractor's obligation is one that he has voluntarily assumed. He is bound because he has made a promise or undertaking that the
law will enforce. And the only difference between an express contract and a
contract implied in fact is that in the former the promise or undertaking is
verbal, while in the latter it is an implication of the promisor's conduct. But
quasi contractual obligations are imposed without reference to the obligor's
assent. He is bound, not because he has promised to make restitution-it may
be that he has explicitly refused to promise-but because he has received a
benefit the retention of which would be inequitable.
WOODWARD, QuAsi CoNrrc-s § 4 at 6 (1913).
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ciples came to a head in the Ryan decision and can be examined most
easily along with that case. The quasi-contractual theory will be examined briefly at this point.
In the absence of the Longshoremen's Compensation Act, there
would be little doubt that the quasi-contractual theory would justify

indemnity in appropriate cases. 68 For example, when both the ship-

owner and the stevedore are liable to the longshoreman, the former
for unseaworthiness without fault and the latter for negligently creating the unseaworthy condition, and the shipowner suffers and satisfies
a judgment, then clearly the two essential requirements for quasi-contractual indemnity are fulfilled. 9 First, the satisfaction of the judgment
by the shipowner operates to confer a benefit on the stevedore, who
is completely released from his liability to the longshoreman. Second,
considering the stevedore's negligence and the shipowner's lack of
negligence, it is surely inequitable to allow the stevedore to retain
the entire benefit. Under these circumstances the authorities actually
as unjustly enriched
indicate that the stevedore would be regarded
70
unless he fully indemnified the shipowner.
Several difficulties are presented when the Longshoremen's Compensation Act is superimposed on the situation.
One difficulty is generated by the limited liability features of the
Act.71 When the shipowner suffers and satisfies a judgment in favor
of the longshoreman, it no longer can be asserted that he confers a
benefit on the stevedore in any amount in excess of the latter's liability
for compensation under the Act. With only a limited benefit conferred,
one would think it rather clear, on principle, that quasi-contractual
indemnity should be limited to that amount.72 Surprisingly, however, no
case has been found which squarely discusses the point, and only one
which, somewhat instinctively, reaches that result.73 The other pre-Ryan
cases which appear to rest at least partially on a quasi-contractual ap74
proach are divided between two extremes. Some allow full indernity

68 See KEENER, QUAsi-CoNTRACTS 408-09 (1893); WooDWARD,
§§ 258-59 (1913); RESTATEwmNT, RESTITUTION § 95 (1937).

QUASI

CONTRACTS

69 "In order to establish the existence of a quasi contractual obligation it must be
shown: (1) That the defendant has received a benefit from the plaintiff. (2) That the
retention of the benefit by the defendant is inequitable." WooDwA.o, QUASI CONTRACTS
§ 7 at 9 (1913).
70 Authorities cited note 68 supra.
71 For the schedule of benefits and their limitations, see §§ 7-9, 33 U.S.C. §§ 907-09
(Supp. Im, 1962).
72 See WOODvAD, QUASI CONTRACTS § 3 (1913).

73 Baccile v. Halcyon Lines, 187 F.2d 403 (3d Cir. 1951), reversed sub nom. Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282 (1952).

74Berti v. Compagni De Navigation, 213 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1954); Palazzolo v.
Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 211 F.2d 277 (2d Cir. 1954), aff'd mea. sub nom. Ryan v.
Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 349 U.S. 901 (1955), aff'd on rehearing, 350 U.S. 124 (1956);
United States v. Rothschild Int'l Stevedoring Co., 183 F.2d 181 (9th Cir. 1950); Rich
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or, if the degrees of fault are approximately equal, then-in the pre75 The other cases deny both
Halcyon cases-ordinary contribution.
70

contribution and indemnity.

The problem with which the courts have struggled most often is

the effect of the employer's exclusive liability provision in section 5 of

the Act. 77 Is the shipowner's indemnity action on the quasi-contractual
theory barred on the ground that it is an action "on account of' the
injury of the longshoreman? On the one hand, it is clear that an action

brought on the employee's right is barred, and it is probably fair to
conclude that the Act bars derivative actions, such as for wrongful
death or loss of consortium. 78 On the other hand, no court has seriously
questioned the shipowner's right to maintain an action on an express

indemnity bond given by the stevedore. On which side should the
quasi-contractual right fall?

Semantically, it would be more accurate to say that the quasicontractual action arises "on account of" the unjust enrichment which
may or may not follow the injury, rather than "on account of" the injury itself. However, the answer probably should not rest on technical

or semantic arguments, but on broader considerations of the economic
results which the different constructions would produce. Assuming

for the purpose of illustration that indemnity, if allowed at all, is to
rest on the quasi-contractual theory, then there appear to be three
possibilities.

If section 5 of the Act is construed to allow unlimited indemnity,79
then the net economic result is that the stevedore is protected by the
Act only within narrow limits. He is required to indemnify the shipowner in the mutual-fault cases whenever the shipowner is merely
passively at fault. On the other hand, the shipowner is economically

unaffected by the Act; his rights and liabilities, under this view, are
what they would be in the absence of the Act.
If section 5 is construed to completely bar indemnity,80 then the
v. United States, 177 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1949); McFall v. Compagnie Maritime Beige,
304 N.Y. 314, 107 N.E.2d 463 (1952).
75 Portel v. United States, 85 F. Supp. 458 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); The S.S. Samovar, 72
F. Supp. 574, 588 (N.D. Cal. 1947); The Tampico, 45 F. Supp. 174 (W.D.N.Y. 1942);
Rederii v. Jarka Corp., 26 F. Supp. 304 (D. Me. 1939).
76 Slattery v. Marra Bros., 186 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1951); American Mut. IAab. Ins.
Co. v. Matthews, 182 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1950); Miranda v. City of Galveston, 98 F. Supp.
245 (S.D. Tex. 1951); Johnson v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 448 (D. Ore. 1948); Standard Wholesale Phosphate & Acid Works, Inc. v. Rukert Term. Corp., 193 Md. 20, 65
A.2d 304 (1949).
77 Quoted supra note 53.
78 Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852
(1950), squarely held that a spouse's action for loss of consortium was not barred, but
the decision was expressly overruled seven years later in Smither & Co. v. Coles, 242
F.2d 220 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 914 (1957).
79 See cases cited supra note 74.
80 See cases cited supra note 76.
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stevedore enjoys a broad scope of protection under the Act. He is not
only free of his maritime liabilities in all cases, but, under Pope &
Talbot, he generally can recoup his compensation payments whenever
the injured employee has an action against a third-party. However,
the necessary result of this view is that the shipowner's ultimate economic burden is considerably increased by the Act. He shoulders the

full liability not only when his negligence contributes to the injury,,
but, under the Sieracki doctrine, whenever an unseaworthy condition
on the ship is a contributory cause. This is a rather toxic consequence

for an Act generally purporting to modify only legal relations between
the longshoreman and his employer.
An intermediate position is reached if section 5 is construed to allow
indemnity, but recovery is limited to the stevedore's liability for compensation under the Act. Under this view, the stevedore's liability
would never extend beyond the limits set by statute. On the other
hand, the shipowner's burden, while greater than in the absence of
the Act, would be considerably less than if indemnity were barred
altogether.
The preferable view would seem to be to allow indemnity to the
extent of the stevedore's liability under the Act. Unlimited indemnity

simply cannot be squared with the fundamentals of unjust enrichment.
On the other hand, the equivocal language of section 5 cannot justify
the increased burden cast on the shipowner when indemnity is completely denied."'
81

An additional problem that has appeared in a number of the cases is the so-called
"common liability requirement." Quasi-contractual contribution and indemnity have been
denied in some of the cases on the ground that shipowner and stevedore do not share a
common liability in tort for the longshoreman's injury. The most notable examples are
Slattery v. Marra Bros., 186 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1951), and American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co.
v. Matthews, 182 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1950). While some of the commentary appears to
approve, Weinstock, supra note 54, at 335; Comment, 37 TuL. L. REv. 786, 791-92
(1963), the approach seems to overemphasize the procedural sense of "common liability." Even if stevedore and shipowner cannot be joined at law by the longshoreman,
surely both are liable for the same injury. The principles of unjust enrichment that apply
to common tort liabilities are essentially the same as those applying to common contractual liabilities. WOODWARD, QuAsI CoN'TaRcrs § 257 (1913); REsTATEmNT, REsTvTUTION, introductory note to title C of chapter 3 at 385 (1937). There seems to be no
legitimate reason for denying contribution or indemnity simply because one party is
liable in contract and the other in tort. See Langmaid, Some Recent Subrogation Problems in the Law of Suretyship and Insurance,47 HAzv. L. REv. 976 (1934). Should there
be a different result simply because one party's liability "sounds in workmen's compensation," which is probably neither tort nor contract? Actual joinder of indemnitor and
indemnitee by the principal obligee is not a prerequisite of indemnity. RE~STATEmENT,
RESmntUoN § 86, comment a (1937). Should a procedural barrier which makes joinder
impossible make a material difference? Bacille v. Halcyon Lines, 187 F.2d 403 (3d Cir.
1951), reversed sub nom. Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342
U.S. 282 (1952), disapproved, quite rightly it would seem, the cases denying contribution and indemnity for lack of a "common liability." In short, unjust enrichment may
exist quite aside from procedural requirements of joinder.
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2. Ryan and the Implied-in-FactPromise of Workmanlike Service
In 1956, in Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Co.,8 2 the
Supreme Court finally came to the shipowner's rescue. In that case
Palazzolo, a longshoreman unloading cargo aboard ship, was injured
due to the defective manner in which the cargo had been stowed in the
ship's prior port of call. Palazzolo sued Pan-Atlantic, the bareboat charterer of the ship, on counts of negligence and unseaworthiness. PanAtlantic brought a third-party indemnity action against Ryan, an
independent stevedoring contractor who had loaded the ship at its
prior port of call. It happened that Ryan was also responsible for unloading the ship, and thus was Palazzolo's employer. Pan-Atlantic and
Ryan had a standing informal letter agreement under which Ryan had
agreed to furnish stevedoring services, but there were no express indemnity provisions. In the trial court, 3 Palazzolo recovered judgment
against Pan-Atlantic, but Pan-Atlantic's indemnity action was dismissed. The trial court found that Ryan had negligently stowed the
cargo, but that Pan-Atlantic was also negligent in failing to properly
supervise the loading and discover the defective stowage. The trial
court concluded "that while Pan-Atlantic was guilty of a lesser degree
of fault than Ryan, it was, nevertheless a joint tort-feasor, and under
such circumstances, a contract of indemnity cannot be implied on the
part of Ryan." s4
The Second Circuit affirmed Palazzolo's judgment, but reversed the
trial court's denial of indemnity.
We think the improper stowage the primary and active cause of the
accident.... [Undemnity over is recoverable where, as here, the employer's negligence was the "sole" "active" or "primary" cause....
Ryan was obligated by implied contract to perform the work in a
reasonable safe manner. This duty Ryan breached; accordingly,
Pan-Atlantic is entitled to indemnity. 5
The first round in the Supreme Court ended with an equally divided Court and the Second Circuit decision was affirmed per curiam
without opinion.8 6 On rehearing,"' the decision was finally affirmed by
a Court divided five to four.
The Court's opinion, by Mr. Justice Burton, has proved durable
and is worthy of close attention:
The [Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation] Act
nowhere expressly excludes or limits a shipowner's right, as a third
person, to insure itself against . . . [his liability to longshoremen]
U.S. 124 (1956).
Palazzolo v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 111 F. Supp. 505 (E.D.N.Y. 1953).
14
Id. at 507.
85
Palazzolo v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 211 F.2d 277, 279 (2d Cir. 1954).
82 350

83

86349

U.S. 901 (1955).

87350 U.S. 124 (1956),supra note 82.
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either by a bond of indemnity, or the contractor's own agreement to
save the shipowner harmless. Petitioner's agreement in the instant
case amounts to the latter for, as will be shown, it is a contractual
undertaking to stow the cargo "with reasonable safety" and thus to
save the shipowner harmless from petitioner's failure to do so ...
The shipowner's action here is not founded upon a tort or upon
any duty which the stevedoring contractor owes to its employee. The
third-party complaint is grounded upon the contractor's breach of its
purely consensual obligation owing to the shipoumer to stow the cargo
in a reasonably safe manner....
That agreement necessarily includes petitioner's obligation not
only to stow the pulp rolls, but to stow them properly and safely.
Competency and safety of stowage are inescapable elements of the
service undertaken. This obligation is not a quasi-contractual obligation implied in law or arising out of a noncontractual relationship.
It is of the essence of petitioner's stevedoring contract. It is petitioner's warranty of workmanlike service that is comparable to a
manufacturer's warranty of the soundness of its manufactured product....

Whatever may have been the respective obligations of the stevedoring contractor and of the shipowner to the injured longshoreman
for proper stowage of the cargo, it is clear that, as between themselves,
the contractor, as the warrantor of its own services, cannot use the
shipowner's failure to discover and correct the contractor's own breach
of warranty as a defense.8s
The sharp dissent by four justices appears to stem largely from
a misunderstanding of the Court's opinion. The dissenters in substance
charged the court with allowing indemnity on the basis of an implied-in-fact promise to indemnify, and they argued, quite rightly, that
there was not the slightest support in the record that such a promise
had been made. The dissenters conceded that if there had been such
a promise the shipowner would be entitled to indemnity. In its absence,
the dissenters assumed that indemnity could be based only on quasicontractual principles, and that, they thought, was forbidden by the
Longshoremen's Act.89
88

Id. at 130-35.

89 I agree, of course, that if the employer here had made a contract, oral or
written, agreeing to hold this shipowner harmless or to indemnify the shipowner
against liability for injuries to the stevedore's employees caused by the shipowner's negligence in whole or in part, the contract would have been valid and
indemnity could have been obtained.... But I think there is not the slightest
support in this record for a finding that any such contract was made.... I recognize that common-law indemnity may sometimes arise where two people
commit a tort or a wrong which hurts the same person.... But indemnity so
imposed is plainly "on account of" the negligence of the wrongdoer or his employees. The Act expressly forbids such a recovery by "anyone" from a stevedoring company "on account" of an injury to one of its longshoremen ....
I
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By assuming that the only alternative to recovery on a quasi-contractual theory was recovery under an implied-in-fact promise*to in-

demnify, the dissenters appear to have overlooked a fundamental point.
The damages which the law imposes for breach of an ordinary contract
to do work are on occasion the same damages that would be imposed
for breach of an express contract to indemnify. As an illustration, suppose A contracted to dismantle, overhaul and reinstall the clapper
valves90 on B's cargo ship. A failed to properly replace the clapper valves

in one hold, and as a result C's cargo on B's ship was damaged by seawater entering the hold on the ship's next voyage. C recovered from B
for breach of the contract of affreightment. B now recovers judgment
from A for breach of the repair contract. Under ordinary principles
of damages B is entitled to recover his losses caused by the breach of

contract, provided they are not too remote. The payments which B
was required to make to C would not be too remote. 91 Note that if A
had promised to indemnify B and save him harmless for all damages
ensuing from improper work, the recoverable damages would be the
same.
The test for limiting damages in the ordinary contract to perform

work is probably the underlying source of the confusion. The usual
statement is that "damages are recoverable only for those injuries that
the defendant had reason to foresee as a probable result of his breach
when the contract was made."9 2 This statement unfortunately suggests
that the determination of recoverable damages is a matter of determining what the parties intended, "foreseeability" being confused with

"intent." This confusion seems to be the source of occasional statesuppose it is for this reason that the Court purports to find an actual contract
to indemnify....
I think there is not a shred of evidence to support the Court's inference
that this stevedore voluntarily agreed to give up the limited labiity... [of the
Act]. The Court finds nothing to support such a conclusion except that the
stevedore agreed to do a stevedoring job. From that the Court implies that it
was to do a good workmanlike job. From there it takes the next step-which
should be more difficult than it appears to be-and says that the stevedoring
company also agreed to give up its immunity under the Act and pay any judgments that might be rendered in favor of the stevedores employees against the
shipowner for its negligence.
350 U.S. at 141-44 (dissenting opinion).
90
Non-return valves which have the function of letting bilge water drain out without allowing sea water in.
91 The illustration is the substance of Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp. v. Joseph Gutradt Co., 10 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1926). The court there held that the damages were not
too remote. Similar is the case of Mowbray v. Merryweather, [1895] 2 Q.B. 640, which
is the basis for RESTATEmENT, CONTRACrs § 334, illustration 5 (1932): "A contracts to
supply B with apparatus for unloading cargo. A chain furnished by A is defective, and
by reason of its breaking C is injured. C gets judgment for damages against B his employer. B can get judgment against A for the amount so paid."
925 CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 1007, at 61 (1951) (stating the substance of Hadley v.
Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341 (1854)).
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ments that a party impliedly promises to pay damages for a breach of
contract. 93 In truth, however, damages are not based on the intent of
the parties; they are imposed by law quite apart from the parties'
intent. 94 It is well settled that the defendant need not actually foresee
the injury.95 A fortiori he need not assent to paying for it. All that
is required is that one in the defendant's position at the time the contract was made would have had reason to foresee the injury. 96 This
hypothetical foreseeability test is merely a working rule that the law
has adopted to 97
avoid imposing damages which would serve no socially
useful purpose.
Thus, in Ryan, all that Pan-Atlantic needed for its recovery was
a contract under which the stevedore expressly promised to do PanAtlantic's stevedoring. From that it can surely be implied, as a matter
of fact, that the stevedore undertook to do a workmanlike job, including the observance of the safety precautions customary to the trade.
No more than that need have been implied. If that contract is breached,
the courts will redress the violation of the shipowner's right with compensatory damages for all injury that is not too remote. While the
Court did not focus on the question of remoteness, it would appear
fair to conclude that the stevedore had reason to foresee that, if he
breached his contract by unsafely stowing the cargo, the shipowner
might well stand liable to third parties for resulting personal injuries.98
This is the substance of the Court's decision; it did not rest on a finding of an implied-in-fact promise to indemnify, which the dissenters
assumed was the only alternative to a quasi-contractual recovery.
Unfortunately, the dissenters' interpretation of the Ryan decision
is shared by a wide following. Larson, for example, has described the
Ryan doctrine as a "sequence of implied agreement superimposed upon
implied agreement,"9 9 meaning an implied indemnity agreement superimposed on an implied agreement to perform in a workmanlike way.
0

3 E.g., Indemnity Ins. Co. v. California Stevedore & Ballast Co., 307 F.2d 513 (9th
Cir. 1962): "In the case at bar, the district court found . . . that though appellees'
agreements to indemnify the shipowners were not expressed in writing, there was in each
contract an implied-in-fact provision that appellees promised to perform their services

with care, and, in the event of a breach of that promise, to indemnify the shipowners
for any liability imposed upon the shipowner for injury to any longshoreman."
04 5 CoanN, CONrACTs § 1010 (1951).
951d. §§ 1009, 1012.
6ibid.
971d. § 1006.
08 Cases cited supra note 91.
99 2 LAnsoN, WoBxaan's CozwENsATioN § 76.10, at 227 (Supp. 1963). See also
White, A New Look at the Shipowner's Right-Over for Shipboard Injuries, 12 STAN.
L. Bly. 717, 721 (1960) ("term of indemnification... implied into contract"); Comment, 38 TUL. L. REv. 202, 203-04 (1964) ("implied contract to indemnify"); 49 VA.
L. REv. 599, 603 (1963) (dissenters' view "seems justified").
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Others have described the Ryan doctrine as a "contractual fiction" 100
or have confused express indemnity provisions with the Ryan doctrine
by calling them both "warranties." 101 More important is the fact that
this interpretation has appeared and proved troublesome in the postRyan decisions.
The difficulties are most pronounced in cases where an express indemnity provision is coupled with a promise to render services. Suppose, for instance, that the stevedoring contract in Ryan had included
an express indemnity provision which did not squarely cover the
injury, e.g., "The stevedore shall indemnify and save the shipowner
harmless in case of damage to property or injury to persons, including
employees of the stevedore, resulting solely from the stevedore's negligence." Since Palazzolo's injury was the result of concurring negligence
of Pan-Atlantic and Ryan, rather than the sole negligence of Ryan,
there would be considerable difficulty in allowing the shipowner indemnification on the basis of the express indemnity provision. 0 2 Assuming that indemnity is not allowed under that provision, does the
rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius operate to bar indemnity
on the basis on which it was allowed in Ryan? If the Ryan holding
rests on an implied-in-fact promise to indemnify, as the dissenters assumed, the answer should be in the affirmative. But if the holding rests
on an express promise to render stevedoring services (with an impliedin-fact promise of workmanlike performance), the expressio unius rule
should have no application. The promise to indemnify for a particular
loss may fairly imply that there is no promise to indemnify for another,
but it does not fairly imply that the stevedore is limiting the damages
which the law imposes for breach of his chief promise to perform stevedoring services. To do the latter the clause would have to operate as
a disclaimer provision, and disclaimer provisions are strictly construed
against the party attempting to limit his damages. 0 3
The expressio unius rule was applied by the trial court in the recent
case of Italia Societa Per Anzioni di Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring Co.'04 In that case a shipowner sought indemnity after satisfying
a judgment in favor of a longshoreman whose injuries were attributable
to defective equipment brought aboard by the stevedore. The contract
between the shipowner and stevedore contained an express indemnity
provision under which the stevedore agreed to be responsible for
100 E.g., Stover, Longshoreman-Shipowner-Stevedore: The Circle of Liability, 61
MICH.01L. REv. 539, 550 (1963).
1 E.g., id. at 558; Comment, 37 Tur.L. L. REv. 786, 790 (1963).
102 See Porello v. United States, 94 F. Supp. 952 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); see also A/S
J. Ludwig Mbwinckels Rederi v. Commercial Stevedoring Co., 256 F.2d 227 (2d Cir.
1958).
10 See Annot., 175 A.L.R. 8, 13-20 (1948).
104 310 F.2d 481 (9th Cir. 1962). The unreported trial court decision was summarized by the court of appeals, id. at 482.
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injuries caused by his own negligence. The trial court found that the
stevedore had not been negligent in failing to discover the latent defect
in his equipment, and held that the express indemnity provision covering negligence precluded recovery under the Ryan doctrine, in substance relying on expressio unius. The court of appeals, not reaching
the expressio unius question, affirmed on the ground that even in the absence of the express indemnity clause, the Ryan doctrine does not cover
non-negligent conduct of the stevedore.10 5 The Supreme Court, however, reversed on this point and remanded for the court of appeals to determine the effect of the express indemnity provision on the obligation
to render workmanlike service. 10 6 That decision should be forthcoming.
The Ryan doctrine has not been confined to the maritime. Several
decisions by the California courts have indicated approval of the doctrine. Unfortunately, they appear to have unwittingly adopted the view
that it rests on an implied-in-fact promise to indemnify.
The Ryan case was first relied on in San Francisco Unified School
Dist. v. CaliforniaBldg. Maintenance Co.107 The school district, after
being held liable to an employee of the maintenance company (an
independent contractor) for failure to furnish a safe place to work,
sought indemnity from the maintenance company. The parties had
a written agreement under which the employer had promised to perform maintenance work and to be responsible for damages resulting
from its operations. After a thorough review of the decisions in other
jurisdictions, including Ryan, the court granted the school district
indemnity.
The court [in Ryan] held that the contract of the stevedoring company with the shipowner included, by implication, a provision to save
the shipowner harmless from any damages flowing from a breach of
the contract....
The maintenance company [in the instant case] contracted and
agreed to wash the ...windows from the inside from stepladders.
This contract was breached. Stepladders were not furnished to employees, nor were they instructed to use them. The contract also provided that the maintenance company "is held responsible for payment
of any and all damages" resulting from its operations, Even if this
did not amount to an express contract to indemnify the school district
for damages caused to it by a breach of the contract by the maintenance company, such a warranty or agreement to indemnify would
necessarily be implied.108
105 310 F.2d 481 (9th Cir. 1962).
106 84 Sup. Ct. 748 (1964).
107 162 Cal. App. 2d 434, 328 P.2d 785 (1958).
108 Id. at 447-49, 328 P.2d at 793-94. See CAL. LABOR CODE § 3864, enacted one

year later:
If an action as provided in this chapter prosecuted by the employee, the
employer, or both jointly against the third person results in judgment against
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While the court construed the Ryan decision as the dissenters in Ryan
did, at least there was no suggestion that expressio unius applied.
Three years later, however, the Supreme Court of California applied to similar facts what is in substance the expressio unius rule. In
County of Alameda v. Southern Pac. Co., 10 9 a rock and gravel company
contracted to maintain a portion of a spur track used by the railroad to
service the gravel company. The gravel company agreed to release and
indemnify the railroad from liability for damage by fire to property
owned by or in the custody of the gravel company, and also to release
and indemnify the railroad from liability resulting from the gravel company's operation of its locomotive crane. A motorist lost control of
his vehicle and suffered injuries proximately caused by defective maintenance of a crossing on the portion of the spur track which the gravel
company had contracted to maintain. The railroad satisfied a judgment
in favor of the motorist and sought indemnity from the gravel company.
The trial court granted indemnity, not under the express indemnity
provisions which clearly did not cover the accident, but for breach
of the promise to maintain the crossing. The supreme court stated:
[Tihe cases in California upon which Southern Pacific relies have
treated such an action... as being upon... an implied promise to
indemnify... and the cases cited and discussed in... [San Francisco
Unified School Dist. v. California Bldg. Maintenance Co.] indicate
that courts generally, where they allow such an action, treat it as one
for recovery on an implied promise to indemnify the promisee for
damages which the promisee is compelled to pay because of the
breach by the promisor of his express promise....
The industrial track agreement contains two express provisions by
which Rock [the gravel company] agrees to indemnify Southern Pacific for Southern Pacific's liability for negligence.... Since the parties
industriously expressed these provisions for indemnity, we should be
reluctant to engage Rock in another separate and independent obligation of indemnity by implication. The contract itself . . . gave an
express remedy to Southern Pacific by providing that if Rock failed
in its duty of maintenance, Southern Pacific could itself do the necessary work at Rock's expense.... It is reasonable to conclude that
Southern Pacific, having carefully provided in express terms for indemnity for its own negligence in two particulars, would have likewise made express provision for indemnity against liability based on
such third person or settlement by such third person, the employer shall have
no liability to reimburse or hold such third person harmless on such judgment
or settlement in absence of a written agreement so to do executed prior to the

injury.
Added Cal. Stat. 1959, ch. 955 § 31, p. 2986. Compare Indemnity Ins. Co. v. California
Stevedore & Ballast Co., 307 F.2d 513 (9th Cir. 1962). The court held that the stevedore's liability under the Ryan doctrine was a liability "assumed under written contract"
within the meaning of an insurance policy.
10955 Cal. 2d 479, 11 Cal. Rptr. 751, 360 P.2d 327 (1961).
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its negligent failure to maintain the spur track in proper condition if
it had intended to bind Rock to such an obligation.".0
The promise of the gravel company to maintain the spur track crossing
was thus rendered largely illusory. The duty to maintain became
merely a duty to pay the cost of maintenance, while the railroad's
option to perform became a duty to perform.
Of the courts which have faced the expressio unius question, the
Second Circuit appears to be the only court which has clearly grasped
the real nature of the Ryan doctrine. In Pettus v. Grace Line,"' a
shipowner was held liable to a longshoreman injured when struck by
a draft of coffee bags being lowered by shipboard loading gear. The
winch had a defective brake, but the stevedore's employees continued
to use the equipment, compensating for the malfunction by applying
the brake several feet before the normal cut-off point. The jury found
the ship "unseaworthy with negligence."112 In the third-party action
against the stevedore for indemnity, the jury returned a verdict for
the shipowner. One of the stevedore's contentions on appeal was that
the trial judge erred in instructing the jury that the stevedore warranted workmanlike performance. The written contract between the
parties included a broad indemnity provision under which the stevedore was responsible for damages arising from his negligence, 113 and
the stevedore asserted that this negated the usual warranty of workmanlike service. The court disagreed.
The stevedoring companies explicitly promised to provide all labor
and supervision necessary "for the proper and efficient conduct of the
work" and agreed to provide full stevedoring services for Grace Line's
ships. Similar language has been held to constitute a contractual warranty of workmanlike performance.... The indemnity clause here
defines the scope of liability for the stevedores' negligence and includes a guaranty that the stevedoring companies will carry sufficient
insurance to cover losses arising out of the contractor's negligence.
It does not explicitly disavow the obligations created by the other provisions. In the absence of an express disclaimer we cannot construe
this clause as disavowing the fundamental obligation to provide workmanlike service."1
110 Id. at 487-88, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 757, 360 P.2d at 333. One factual feature of the
case which the court only mentioned was that the county gave the railroad notice in
1951 that the crossing was in need of repair, but the railroad apparently did not advise
the gravel company of this fact until 1953. The railroad might well have been precluded
from recovering damages which, after notice of breach, it should have avoided. See
CoRnMT, CoNTRACTS § 1039 (1951).
11 305 F.2d 151 (2d Cir. 1962).
112 Id. at 152. (The court noted that the record was unclear whether "negligence"
referred to the shipowner or stevedore.)
113 "While performing the work the contractor shall be responsible for any and all
loss, damage or injury, (including death to persons) .... arising through the negligence
or fault of the contractor, its employees, gear or equipment." Id at 155 n.5.
14 Id. at 155. Accord, Drago v. A/S Inger, 305 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1962); Berti v.
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As one can see, the distinction between a promise to indemnify and
a promise to perform in a workmanlike manner is not an idle one. In
the cases where only an ordinary service agreement is involved, the
result does not usually depend on how one interprets the Ryan decision. But when the service agreement is coupled with an express
indemnity provision which does not squarely cover the accident, the
interpretation proves crucial.115
3. Developing the Warranty of Workmanlike Service
While there has been confusion as to whether the stevedore's duty
to indemnify rests on an implied-in-fact promise to indemnify or
merely to perform in a workmanlike way, the duty was clearly laid
down in Ryan as a contractual obligation. It was "of the essence" of
the stevedoring contract. 116 The post-Ryan decisions in the Supreme
Court, however, have cast the obligation into the sea of warranty. 1 7
Compagnie De Navigation Cyprien Fabre, 213 F.2d 397, 400-01 (2d Cir. 1954).
In D'Agosta v. Royal Netherlands S.S. Co., 301 F.2d 105 (2d Cir. 1962), where an
express indemnity provision squarely covered the injury, a stevedore appealed on the
ground that the shipowner did not allege a cause of action on the express indemnity provision and that the provision precluded a recovery on the Ryan doctrine. The court said
"We agree with the appellant that an action on an implied warranty cannot be maintained in this case because of the existence of the express indemnity provision." Id. at
107 (emphasis added). The court rejected the stevedores procedural objections and
sustained the recovery on the express indemnity clause. It should be emphasized that the
indemnity clause covered injuries "in any manner connected with the performance of
this contract, whether such injury shall be caused by the negligence of the contractor or
the... [steamship company] up to a limit of $100,000 for each person .. " In Pettus
v. Grace Line, from all that appears, the jury may have been allowed to base its verdict
on the express indemnity provision and the promise to perform in a workmanlike manner
ithout making an alternative decision. Can that be reconciled with the dictum in
D'Agosta? Compare Read v. United States, 201 F.2d 758 (3d Cir. 1953), where the
shipowner sought "indemnity by operation of law," and not on the basis of an express
indemnity clause or a contract to do work (though both were present), in order to reach
the bankrupt stevedores insurance, which covered only liability imposed on the stevedore
"by law." The case appears to hold that the indemnity action can be maintained on
three theories at the same time. Id. at 763.
115 An additional problem is raised when the stevedore attempts to recover from
his insurance carrier after indemnifying the shipowner. Many policies exclude "liability
assumed under a contract or agreement." Indemnity Ins. Co. v. California Stevedore &
Ballast Co., 307 F.2d 513 (9th Cir. 1962), held that a stevedore's liability under the
Ryan doctrine was a "liability assumed under a written contract," but under the peculiar
policy involved this resulted in a judgment against the insurance company. Compare Lo
Bue v. United States, 188 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1951), and Read v. United States, supra
note 114.
116 350 U.S. at 133.

11 7
In describing the development of strict liability in the products liability field,
Prosser has remarked:
The adoption of this particular device [warranty] was facilitated by the
peculiar and uncertain nature and character of warranty, a freak hybrid born of
the illicit intercourse of tort and contract. "A more notable example of legal
miscegenation could hardly be cited than that which produced the modern
action for breach of warranty. Originally sounding in tort, yet arising out of
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The first seed was planted in the Ryan opinion itself, where a single
sentence described the stevedore's obligation as a "warranty of workmanlike service that is comparable to a manufacturer's warranty of the
soundness of its manufactured product."" 8 However, in view of the
numerous other assertions that the right was a contractual right, and
the assertion that it did not rest in tort or in quasi-contract, that one
sentence concerning warranty without further articulation added little
if anything to the Court's rationale. But, as we shall see, little seeds
generate large trees.
In Crumady v. The Joachim Hendrik Fisser,"0 a longshoreman
recovered a judgment for unseaworthiness in an action in rem against
the ship. At the time of the injury the ship apparently was under the
operation and control of a bareboat charterer 120 who had contracted
for the stevedoring services. However, at the trial, the shipowner,
rather than the charterer, appeared as claimant of the ship and sought
indemnity from the stevedore. The question was thus raised whether
a contractual relationship is essential to support the indemnity action.
The entire discussion of the Court on this point follows:
The contract, however, mentioned the name of the vessel on which
the work was to be done and contained an agreement on the part of
the stevedoring company "to faithfully furnish such stevedoring services."
We think this case is governed by the principle announced in the
Ryan case. The warranty which a stevedore owes when he goes
aboard a vessel to perform services is plainly for the benefit of the
vessel whether the vessels owners are parties to the contract or not.
That is enough to bring the vessel into the zone of modern law that
recognizes rights in third-party beneficiaries. Restatement, Law of
Contracts, section 133. Moreover, as we said in the Ryan case, "competency and safety of stowage are inescapable elements of the service
undertaken".. . . They are part of the stevedore's "warranty of workmanlike service that is comparable to a manufacturer's warranty of
the soundness of its manufactured product.". . . See MacPherson v.
Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050.121
the warrantor's consent to be bound, it later ceased necessarily to be consensual
and at the same time came to lie mainly in contract."
Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citidel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J.
1099, 1126 (1960), quoting Note, 42 HADv. L. LEv. 414-15 (1929).
's 350 U.S. at 133.
I's 358 U.S. 423 (1959).
120 The record in Crumady does not disclose the nature of the charter, but in a subsequent case, Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Dugan & McNamara, Inc., 364 U.S. 421 (1960),
which came up through the same circuit, both the court of appeals, King v. Waterman
S.S. Corp., 272 F.2d 823, 826 (3d Cir. 1959), and the Supreme Court, 364 U.S. at 424,
indicated that the ship in Crumady was operated by the charter party. Of the three
principal types of charter parties, only the bareboat charterer operates and controls the
ship. See GmmorE & BLAcK, ArmnuLTY 170-71, 216-17 (1957). The bareboat charterer takes the ship 'lock, stock and barrel" and becomes owner pro hac vice. Id. at 171.
22 358 U.S. at 428-29.
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The fairest interpretation of this passage is that the shipowner is
entitled to indemnity under the Ryan doctrine as a third party beneficiary of the contract between the charterer and the stevedore. There
are, however, other alternatives. Perhaps the ship itself, and not the
shipowner, is to be regarded literally as a third-party beneficiary. Under sound legal analysis, it is doubtful that a ship qua ship is capable
of being, or suing as, a third-party beneficiary of a contract, but under
the vague metaphors of the maritime action in rem, anything is conceivable. 1 22 And the Court did say that the contract was "for the beneof the vessel."
Another possibility is raised by the last sentence quoting the passage in Ryan describing the stevedore's obligation as a warranty. Is
the Court suggesting under notions of warranty that the shipowner
can have indemnity without even the standing of a third-party beneficiary? The MacPherson case, which the Court cited, is a leading
authority for eliminating privity requirements in the products liability
field, but that action sounded wholly in negligence.
Assuming that the Court allowed the shipowner recovery as a thirdparty beneficiary, and this seems to be the fairest interpretation, is it
justified? This theory is a consensual one-the third party's rights arise
because of the intentions of the promisor and promisee. Section 133
of the Restatement of Contracts, which the Court cited, defines three
types of third-party beneficiaries: (1) donees, (2) creditors, and (3)
incidental beneficiaries. Obviously a gift was not intended, and if the
shipowner was an incidental beneficiary, he acquired no rights under
the contract. 123 Presumably, the Court thought the shipowner was
a beneficiary of the creditor species. Section 133 states "where performance of a promise in a contract will benefit a person other than
the promisee, that person is . . . a creditor beneficiary if . . .performance of the promise will satisfy an actual or supposed or asserted duty of the promisee to the beneficiary ... ." In Crumady,
wherein lay the "actual or supposed" duty owed by the charterer to the
shipowner which the parties contemplated that the stevedore would
satisfy? Was the charterer under an "actual or supposed" duty to the
shipowner to have safe and workmanlike stevedoring services performed? The shipowner being a bareboat lessor, this is extremely
doubtful. The shipowner is not interested in the way the charterer
manages the ship; he is not concerned with how or whether the ship
122 In Continental Grain Co. v. Barge FBL-585, 364 U.S. 19 (1960), an in rem
action, a change of venue under the forum non conveniens doctrine was sought by the
barge owner. The Court was not very sympathetic with the fiction of the suit in rem.
It quoted with approval the following language from The City of Norwich, 118 U.S.
468, 503 (1885): "To say that an owner is not liable, but that his vessel is liable, seems
to us like talking in riddles.... In the matter of liability, a man and his property cannot
be separated ...." 364 U.S. at 24.
123 REsTATEmENT, CoNTEAcTs § 147 (1932).
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is not even personally liable for injuries
is loaded and unloaded; 1 24 he
12 5
suffered during the demise.

True, the charterer is ordinarily under an express contract to indemnify and save the shipowner harmless from libels asserted against
the ship, 126 but if this was the charterer's duty which the stevedore
agreed to satisfy, then nothing less than an express promise to indem12 7
nify, expressly running to the shipowner, would appear sufficient.
There was, however, not the slightest evidence of such a promise even
to the charterer, and real promises to indemnify are not easily inferred.128 And if one did in fact exist in favor of the charterer, it is
doubtful that it could be extended by implication, in any realistic
sense, to the shipowner.129 In short, it is rather implausible that either
the charterer or the stevedore in any way contemplated the shipowner
as a beneficiary of their contract. Thus, under close appraisal, it appears that the Court imposed indemnity on the stevedore and fictitiously passed it off as a matter of contract. This is a far cry from Ryan.
Indemnity was imposed in Ryan for breach of a simple contractual
agreement to furnish workmanlike stevedoring services. Crumady,
however, is a case of indemnity imposed solely as a matter of law.
One year later, the same issue was back before the Court, and this
time under more favorable circumstances. In Crumady, the privity of
contract issue was only one of several questions before the Court. However, in Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Dugan & McNamara, Inc.,130 certiorari was granted solely to consider whether a contractual relationship
124See generally Gm.4ora & BLAcK, ADmn.vrr 170-71, 215-19 (1957).
125 Pichirilo v. Guzman, 290 F.2d 812 (1st Cir. 1961), zev'd on other grounds, 369

U.S. 698 (1962); Grillea v. United States, 229 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1956); Vitozi v. Balboa
Shipping Co., 163 F.2d 286 (1st Cir. 1947). It has been held, however, that if the
unseaworthiness exists at the time of the demise, the owner is personally liable. CanLykes Bros. S.S. Co., 174 F.2d 794 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 859 (1949).
nella v.
220 An indemnity agreement is apparently a standard clause in a bareboat-charter
contract. See Read v. The Yaka, 183 F. Supp. 69, 76 n.7 (E.D. Pa. 1960). Such agreements were also involved in Grillea v. United States, 232 F.2d 919, 924 (2d Cir. 1956),
v. The S.S. Esparta, 188 F. Supp. 168 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
and Leotta
2 7
1
In Ferrigno v. Ocean Transport, Ltd., 309 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1962), a longshoreman recovered a judgment from the shipowner for unseaworthiness. The longshoreman
was employed by a stevedore who had been engaged, not by the shipowner, but by a
charterer which had hired the ship to carry cargo-apparently on a specific voyage. The
charterer, in any event, was not operating the ship. The trial court, 201 F. Supp. 173
(S.D.N.Y. 1961), held that the shipowner was a third party beneficiary of the following
indemnity provision: "The Stevedoring Company further agrees to indemnify ... the
charterers [and their agents] against any loss sustained as a result of any claim ...
whatever which may be brought by any... employee of the Stevedoring Company...
9201 F. Supp.
for ... personal injury sustained during the progress of the work...2
at 180. The Second Circuit reversed on the ground that "there was no showing of any
intent" in the contract to indemnify the shipowner. 309 F.2d at 446.
128 See generally Annot., 175 A.L.R. 8, 20-38 (1948).
129 See note 127 supra.
130 364 U.S. 421 (1960).
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was necessary. 131 Moreover, the Third Circuit, concerning itself solely
with the one issue, had considered the point no less than three times,
first before a division
of the court and then twice by rehearing before
1 32
the court en banc.
The facts in this case varied only slightly from Crumady. The original longshoreman's action was in personam against the shipowner,
who had control of the ship at the time of the injury. The stevedoring
services had been contracted for by the consignee of the cargo, and
not by an operator of the ship. In its third-party action against the
stevedore, Waterman, the shipowner, neither alleged nor sought to
prove a third-party beneficiary contractual relationship. 1 33 The shipowner, claiming no contractual standing whatsoever, apparently based
his case on a theory that indemnity should be allowed simply because
the stevedore was primarily responsible for the injury. 34
The Third Circuit finally affirmed the trial court's denial of indemnity. Appraising Crumady, the court said that "the actual holding...
seems to be that a contractual undertaling of the stevedore with the
operator of the ship, who is not the owner, to unload in a safe and
workmanlike manner inures to the ship." 13 5 The court thought that it
could not go a step farther and allow indemnity where the stevedore
had been engaged by the consignee of the cargo. The court regarded
the shipowner and stevedore as contractual strangers, and concluded
that a judgment for the shipowner, in the absence of a contractual relationship,
would collide with the non-contribution rule of the Halcyon
86
case.
A unanimous Supreme Court reversed:
In the Ryan and Weyerhaeuser cases considerable emphasis was
placed upon the direct contractual relationship between the shipowner
and the stevedore. If those decisions stood alone, it might well be
thought an open question whether such contractual privity is essential to support the stevedore's duty to indemnify. But the fact is that
bridge was crossed in the Crumady case. There we explicitly held
that the stevedore's assumption of responsibility for the shipowner's
damages resulting from unsafe and improper performance of the
stevedoring services was unaffected by the fact that the shipowner
was not the party who had hired the stevedore. That case was decided upon the factual premise that the stevedore had been engaged
not by the shipowner, but by the party operating the ship under a
.137
charter. The Court's language was unambiguous:
Id. at 423.
132 King v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 272 F.2d 823, 824 (3d Cir. 1959).
133Id. at 825.
134 Ibid.
35 Id. at 826.
21

136 Ibid.

The Court here quoted the passage from Crumady which appears in the text at
note 121 supra.
137
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This reasoning is applicable here. We can perceive no difference in
principle, so far as the stevedore's duty to indemnify the shipowner
is concerned, whether the stevedore is engaged by an operator to
whom the owner has chartered the vessel or by the consignee of the
cargo. Nor can there be any significant distinction in this respect
whether the longshoreman's original
claim was asserted in an in rem
38
or an in personam proceeding.1
When a case has been litigated all the way through the Supreme
Court entirely on one question, whether a contractual relationship is
necessary to sustain the indemnity action, it would seem altogether
impertinent thereafter to ask that question seriously. But quaere is
the shipowner's indemnity action here based on his standing as a
third party beneficiary of a contract?
The language of the above passage, if one ignores the quote from
Crumady, is consistent with the proposition that the shipowner need
not qualify as a third party beneficiary. This interpretation is greatly
buttressed when one considers the state of the record below- a contractual relationship was neither pleaded, proved, nor stipulated. 139
On the other hand, the language is also consistent with the proposition that the shipowner qualified as a third party beneficiary. While
the Court did clearly say that a direct contractual relationship is not
necessary, a third party beneficiary's contractual relationship could be
regarded as other than direct. The quote from Crumady, which was
examined earlier, buttresses this latter view. Judging from subsequent
lower court decisions, one can cite Waterman for either proposition. 140
The nature of the stevedore's warranty (and by this time the obligation was seldom called anything else) finally was given a measure
of judicial realism by the Second Circuit in DeGioia v. United States
Lines.' 4 ' In that case, a diehard stevedore, who had contracted with
a cargo consignee, appealed from an indemnity judgment on essentially the same question that was litigated in Waterman. Judge Clark
wrote for the court:
...

[The stevedore's] claim rests, however, on a misunderstanding

of the nature of the stevedores obligation to indemnify the shipowner
for damages paid by the latter to injured longshoremen. It is misleading to consider this literally only an action ex contractu. The
basis of the stevedore's obligation is its implied warranty of workmanlike service. The obligations which arise from warranty are not
limited to the confines of an action on the contract; the zone of responsibility may extend beyond those in direct contractual relationship.... This is the meaning, as we see it, of Waterman S.S. Corp v.

Dugan & McNamara, Inc....
138

364 U.S. 421 at 423-24.

139 272 F.2d at 825.
140 Compare Drago v.

A/S Inger, 305 F.2d 139, 142 (2d Cir. 1962), with DeGioia

v. United States Lines, 304 F.2d 421, 425, 426 (2d Cir. 1962).

241 304 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1962).
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The function of the doctrine of unseaworthiness and the corollary doctrine of indemnification is allocation of the losses caused by
shipboard injuries to the enterprise, and within the several segments
of the enterprise, to the institution or institutions most able to minimize the particular risk involved .... Thus while the cases speak
in the language of contract, it is misleading to cling to the literal implications of that language. Since the shipowner here was held liable
for injuries the jury found were the foreseeable result of the stevedores' failure to perform in a workmanlike fashion, it may recover
indemnification, whether it was strictly a "third party beneficiary"
or not. Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Dugan & McNamara, Inc. .... 142
Judge Clark frankly acknowledged that the shipowner's action is
not necessarily based on contract. At the same time, there was no
attempt to justify the action on a quasi-contractual theory. Judge Clark
did mention "warranty," but the meaning of that term presumably
is to be gathered from the context. The thrust of the passage appears
to be that indemnity is imposed by law on the plain theory that the
injury was the foreseeable result of the stevedore's failure to perform
in a workmanlike manner, and since the stevedore is best able to
minimize such injuries, he is liable. 1 4 3 This rationale has merit, for
only on this basis can the indemnity cases be reconciled. As we have
seen, the quasi-contractual theory will justify indemnity only to the
extent of the stevedore's compensation liability.14 4 And the original
Ryan doctrine will justify indemnity only where there is a contractual
relationship.
As the doctrine stands today, the shipowner need not concern himself, on the one hand, with concepts of unjust enrichment or active
and passive negligence. 14 5 On the other hand, he need not allege or
prove a contract. The doctrine may be called "warranty" but there
Id. at 425-26.
x4a Compare Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697,
377 P.2d 897 (1963) (Traynor, J.). The Supreme Court of California weened the consumer's products liability action from the law of warranty as well as the law of sales.
Although in these cases strict liability has usually been based on the theory of
an express or implied warranty running from the manufacturer to the plaintiff,
the abandonment of the requirement of a contract between them, the recognition that the liability is not assumed by agreement but imposed by law ... ,
and the refusal to permit the manufacturer to define the scope of its own responsibility for defective products make clear that the liability is not one governed by the law of contract warranties but by the law of strict liability in tort.
59 Cal. 2d at 63, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701, 377 P.2d at 901.
142

144 See text at note 72 supra.
45

' In Ryan the Court said the shipowner's action did not rest in quasi-contract or
tort. 350 U.S. 124 at 131. This was re-emphasized in Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. Nacirema Operating Co., 355 U.S. 563, 569 (1957). The Court said that "sound judicial
administration requires us to point out that in the area of contractual indemnity an application of the theories of 'active' or 'passive' as well as 'primary' or 'secondary' negligence is inappropriate."
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has never been any serious consideration of misrepresentation or
reliance. 4 6
4. The Stevedore's Breach
The stevedore's obligation to render safe and workmanlike service
is quite broad in definition. Its specific features, however, have been
filled in rather well by a considerable volume of litigation since the
Ryan case. Today one can trace with some assurance the line between
performance and breach.
In Ryan itself it was settled that the warranty (as it is now called)
is breached when the injury-producing conditions are created by the
stevedore's negligence. It is now clear that the warranty may be
breached in the absence of negligence. In a recent case, the Supreme
Court, reversing the Ninth Circuit, decided that a stevedore who
brings aboard defective equipment which renders a ship unseaworthy
must indemnify the147shipowner, notwithstanding that the stevedore is
free of negligence.
It was also settled in Ryan that a shipowner may recover for the
stevedore's breach though the shipowner negligently fails to discover
the dangerous condition created by the stevedore. 148 It is now apparis entitled to indemnity even when
ently settled that the shipowner
14 9
he knows of the hazard.
When the injury-causing condition is not created by the stevedore,
the considerations are somewhat different. The stevedore has no affirmative duty to inspect for danger15o Yet once he has knowledge,
he breaches his warranty if he continues work in the face of the
146 In examining the development of strict liability to the consumer in the products
liability field, Prosser has remarked:
Traditionally, warranty requires that the plaintiff shall act in reliance upon
some representation or assurance, or some promise or undertaking, given to him
by the defendant. This is extraordinarily difficult, and may be quite impossible
to make out where, as is frequently the case, the consumer does not know who
has made or sold the goods, and does not care. The husband or guest who eats
a plate of beans seldom asks the housewife whose product they are, and still
less often at what store she bought them.
Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE: L.J.

1099, 1128 (1960).

147 Italia Societa per Azione di Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., 84 Sup. Ct.
748 (1964). Accord, Booth S.S. Co. v. Meier & Oelhaf Co., 262 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1958).
148 350 U.S. 124, 134-35 (1956).
149 Beard v. Ellerman Lines, 289 F.2d 201 (3d Cir. 1961), re'd on other grounds,
Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines, 369 U.S. 355 (1962) (knowledge of
unsafe method in discharging cargo); Curtis v. A. Garcia y Cia, Ltd., 272 F.2d 235
(3d Cir. 1959) (knowledge of unsafe custom in discharging cargo); Simpson v. Royal
Rotterdam Lloyd, 225 F. Supp. 947 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Nicroli v. Den Norske Afrika-Og
Australielinie, 210 F. Supp. 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
150 Orlando v. Prudential S.S. Corp., 313 F.2d 822, 823 (2d Cir. 1963); Cia Maritima Del Nervion v. James J. Flanagan Shipping Corp., 308 F.2d 120, 125 (5th Cir.
1962); Ignatyuk v. Tramp Chartering Corp., 250 F.2d 198, 201 (2d Cir. 1957).
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hazard. 151 The stevedore must either remove the danger or actually
discontinue work until the danger is eliminated by the shipowner.
Continuing work after merely notifying the shipowner of the hazard
is not regarded as workmanlike service, 152 though it may be if the
shipowner affirmatively orders work to continue despite the hazard. 5 3
Even if the stevedore does not discover the unseaworthy condition, he
will be liable if his independent negligence can be said to "call the
condition into play." Thus in Crumady v. Joachim Hendrik Fisser, 54
the ship was unseaworthy, though unknown to the stevedore, in that
an electrical safety device on a winch was set by the ship's crew with
too high a tolerance. A longshoreman was injured when the stevedore's
employees put too great a strain on the winch, causing the boom to
collapse. The shipowner obtained indemnity on the theory that the
stevedore's independent negligence "called into play" the unknown
danger in the loading gear. 155
As one can see even from this brief survey, the shipowner has had
almost as much success with his indemnity action as the longshoreman
has had with his unseaworthiness claim. Indeed, when the stevedore
created the unseaworthy condition, no case has been found where
the shipowner has been denied indemnity. And although someone
else creates the condition, the shipowner nevertheless is entitled to
indemnity if the stevedore either discovers the condition or negligently
calls it into play.
In DeGioia v. United States Lines,156 Judge Clark stated that the
function of the Ryan doctrine is to allocate the losses caused by shipboard injuries to the entrepreneur best able to minimize the particular
15 1 De Gioia v. United States Lines, 304 F.2d 421, 423-24 (2d Cir. 1962); American

President Lines v. Marine Terminals Corp., 234 F.2d 753 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 926 (1956);

Simpson v. Royal Rotterdam Lloyd, 225 F. Supp. 947 (S.D.N.Y.

1964); Nordeutsher Lloyd, Brennan v. Brady-Hamilton Stevedore Co., 195 F. Supp.
680, 683 (D. Ore. 1961); Revel v. American Export Lines, 162 F. Supp. 279, 287 (E.D.

Va. 1958), aff'd, 266 F.2d 82 (4th Cir. 1959).
There is some authority contra in the Third Circuit. See Smith v. Pan-Atlantic S.S.
Corp., 254 F.2d 600 (3d Cir. 1958), affirming per curiara 161 F. Supp. 422 (E.D. Pa.

1957); Hagans v. Farrell Lines, 237 F.2d 477 (3d Cir. 1956); Thompson v. Trent
Maritime Co., 222 F. Supp. 221, 223-25 (E.D. Pa. 1963). Perhaps the cases can be dis-

tinguished. See Hodgson v. Lloyd Brasileiro Patrimonio Nacional, 294 F.2d 32 (3d Cir.
1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 848 (1962). But with Hodgson, compare Pettus v. Grace
Line, 305 F.2d 151 (2d Cir. 1962).
15? Simpson v. Royal Rotterdam Lloyd, 225 F. Supp. 947 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). Cf.
cases cited supra note 151.
13 Torrez Cruz v. Hudson S.S. Co., 206 F. Supp. 216 (D.P.R. 1962), aff'd per
curiam sub nom. Hudson S.S. Co. v. Ayala Colon, 314 F.2d 44 (1st Cir. 1963). Cf.
United States v. Harrison, 245 F.2d 911 (9th Cir. 1957).
154

358 U.S. 423 (1959).

155 Accord, Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Dugan & McNamara, Inc., 364 U.S. 421 (1960);
Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Nacirema Operating Co., 266 F.2d 79 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 361

U.S. 816 (1959).
156 304 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1962).
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risk involved. 157 Assuming that to be true, the Ryan doctrine has served
exceedingly well. Bearing in mind that the stevedore is the expert in
matters of loading and unloading and that he is principally in charge
of the stevedoring operations, it can be fairly said that in virtually all
of the situations where the stevedore is required to indemnify the
shipowner, he is in the best position to minimize the risks involved.
The situation where the stevedore's independent negligence calls into
play an unknown defect in ship's equipment raises the closest question.
Contribution would probably produce the fairest result, but if one
must make an either-or choice, then even here the stevedore probably
is best able to minimize the risks.
Although the Ryan doctrine appears sound, there may be serious
question as to the merits of the Sieracki doctrine. It is quite arguable
that many of the cases should not be taken from the umbrella of the
Compensation Act in the first instance. Indeed, the Ryan doctrine
appears to be largely the child of the extreme virility enjoyed by the
doctrine of unseaworthiness. The Sieracki decision itself was perhaps
not wrongly decided. At least it can be said that, as between shipowner and stevedore, the shipowner is in a better position to minimize
the risks created by basic defects in the ship's hull and equipment,
such as the defective boom shackle which caused Sieracki's injury.
Unfortunately, the doctrine has been extended to extremes. Progressing largely on factual analogies, rather than on step-by-step examination of each case in light of fundamental principles, the decisions have
extended the Sieracki doctrine until it now embraces a great variety
of risks which the stevedore is in far better position than the shipowner
to minimize. It became obvious that the shipowner was paying for a
large number of the stevedore's wrongs. In short, Ryan was needed
to atone for Sieracki's excesses. 158
HI. THE LONGSHOREMAN'S MARITIME ACTION AGAINST
HIS EMPLOYER FOR UNSEAWORTHINESS
If the caption to this section is astonishing, so is the result in the
case of Reed v. The Yaka.' 59 Longshoreman Reed was injured aboard
ship, while engaged in loading operations, when his foot went through
a latently defective pallet. Reed filed a libel in rem against the ship
to recover for his injuries. The owner of the ship, Waterman Steam157

Id. at 426.

158 The shipowner was first held liable for defective equipment brought aboard by

the stevedore in Alaska S.S. Co. v. Petterson, 347 U.S. 396 (1954), affirming mem. 205
F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1953). The case was decided over the vigorous dissent of three
Justices in March of 1954. Certiorari was granted in Ryan in October of 1954. In April
of 1955, the decision of the Second Circuit granting the shipowner indemnity was affirmed without opinion by an equally divided Court. 349 U.S. 901. The landmark opinion in Ryan was rendered on rehearing in January of 1956. 450 U.S. 124.
159 373 U.S. 410 (1963).
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ship Corporation, answered the libel and impleaded Pan-Atlantic
Steamship Corporation, the bareboat charterer of the ship at the time
of the injury.
Reed had good reason not to prosecute a personal action against
the shipowner, as a bareboat demise generally is thought to personally
immunize the owner from claims for unseaworthiness, 160 at least when
the unseaworthy conditions arise after the demise.' 61 This was clearly
the case in Yaka, as62the defective pallet was brought aboard by the
bareboat charterer.1

Reed had even better reason for not bringing a personal action
against Pan-Atlantic. A bareboat charterer is regarded as owner pro
hac vice and undoubtedly is personally liable for claims of unseaworthiness, 6 8 but in this case a seemingly unsurmountable difficulty existed,
as Pan-Atlantic was Reeds employer. An independent stevedoring
contractor had not been engaged. As the law stood, the Longshoremen's Act appeared to be Reed's sole remedy against Pan-Atlantic.
There were two rather outlandish theories on which one might
have given Reed an outside chance to succeed with his libel in rem,
but the prospects under both must have appeared rather dim. One
possibility was that the ship could be held liable, notwithstanding the
personal immunity of both the owner and the bareboat charterer. One
Second Circuit decision had been so construed. 64 However, two other
circuits, including the Third Circuit in which the action was brought,
had squarely held that the libel in rem was essentially a procedural
device and that there had to be an underlying or lein-creating liability.165 The other possibility was that the shipowner would be regarded personally liable, despite the bareboat demise, and that this
would support the libel in rem. The court of appeals decisions were
66 but the Supreme Court had recently
all at odds with this proposition,'
67
reserved the question.'

160 Pichirilo v. Guzman, 290 F.2d 812 (1st Cir. 1961), reo'd on other grounds, 369
U.S. 698 (1962); Grillea v. United States, 229 F.2d 687 rev'd on other grounds on
rehearing, 232 F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1956); Vitozi v. Balboa Shipping Co., 163 F.2d 286
(1st Cir. 1947).
161 Cannella v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 174 F.2d 794 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S.
859 (1949), held that the demisor was liable for unseaworthiness arising prior to the
demise.
162 373 U.S. at 411.
163 See Cannella v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 174 F.2d 794 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 338
U.S. 859 (1949). See also GimonE & BrAcx, AD mmALr 218 (1957).
164 Grillea v. United States, 232 F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1956). -See discussion of this
case in Pichirilo v. Guzman, 290 F.2d 812 (1st Cir. 1961), supra note 160, at 815.
165 Smith v. The Marmacdale, 198 F.2d 849 (3d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S.
908 (1953); Samuels v. Munson S.S. Line, 63 F.2d 861 (5th Cir. 1933). That the
Supreme Court views the libel in rem as little more than a convenient procedural device,
see Continental Grain Co. v. Barge FBL-585, 364 U.S. 19 (1960).
166 Cases cited supra note 160.
167 Guzman v. Pichirilo, 369 U.S. 698, 700 (1961).
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As the case turned out, the Supreme Court expressly declined to
reach either theory. 68 Instead, the Court held that Pan-Atlantic, Reeds
employer, could be held personally liable in its capacity as a bareboat
charterer, despite the provisions of the Longshoremen's Act, and that
this personal liability would support the libel in rem. 1 9
Pan-Atlantic has not pointed and could not point to any economic
difference between giving relief in this case, where the owner [pro
hac vice] acted as his own stevedore, and in one in which the owner
hires an independent company. In either case, under Ryan, the burden
ultimately falls on the company whose default caused the injury....
W]e cannot now consider the wording of the statute alone. We must
view it in the light of our prior cases in this area, like Sieracki, Ryan,
and others, the holdings of which have been left unchanged by Congress. In particular, we pointed out several times in the Sieracki
case, which has been consistently followed since, that a shipowner's
obligation of seaworthiness cannot be shifted about, limited, or
escaped by contracts .... And Ryan's holding that a negligent stevedoring company must indemnify a shipowner has in later cases been
followed and to some degree extended. In the light of this whole body
of law, statutory and decisional, only blind adherence to the superficial meaning of a statute could prompt us to ignore the fact that
Pan-Atlantic was not only an employer of longshoremen but was also
a bareboat charterer and operator of a ship and, as such, was charged
with the traditional, absolute, and nondelegable obligation of seaworthiness which it should not be permitted to avoid.... We think it
would produce a harsh and incongruous result, one out of keeping
with the dominant intent of Congress to help longshoremen, to distinguish between liability to longshoremen injured under precisely
the same circumstances because some draw their pay directly from
a shipowner
and others from a stevedoring company doing the ship's
70
service.'

There is no question about squaring this decision with the Longshoremen's Act. As the dissent pointed out,' 7 1 it simply cannot be
done. In effect, section 5 of the Act, which makes the employer's liability for compensation "exclusive and in place of all other liability
...
at law or in admiralty on account of such injury," T2 must be regarded as amended by a proviso: "provided the employer is not an
owner or operator of a ship."
The decision does not rest on an inscrutable mystery of the maritime libel in rem. This is fairly clear from the opinion itself. And in
one recent lower court decision, Yaka was construed, quite rightly it
would seem, to allow a longshoreman to sue his bareboat-charterer6 8373 U.S. at 411 n.1, 412.

169 Reed had not even argued the point. Id. at 417 (dissenting opinion).
170 Id. at 414-15 (footnotes omitted).
171 Id. at 416.
17244

Stat 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1958).
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employer for unseaworthiness in a personal action on the law side of
the federal district court. 17
Is this not a case of an exception devouring a rule? Twenty years
ago (prior to Sieracki), whenever a longshoreman was able to recover
a maritime judgment for his injuries, the recovery came largely as a

windfall. Today the Court finds it so "harsh and incongruous" 1' 4 that
an injured longshoreman should go without a maritime judgment, that
the employment relationship, the backbone of compensation law, falls
before Sieracki's sweep.
CONCLUSION

One cannot survey the developments surrounding the longshoreman's shipboard injury without concluding that an extraordinary
amount of litigation has been generated over what are essentially ordinary occupational casualties. Surely, the great majority of similar nonmaritime casualties are put to rest conclusively under state workmen's
compensation statutes. Yet in the maritime, with a compensation5
statute aimed squarely at the longshoreman's shipboard injuries,17
compensation payments, in what must be a large majority of the cases

of serious injury, mark only the beginning. Only after two essentially
distinct maritime actions does the litigation ordinarily reach its end.
And there have been recent attempts, so far unsuccessful, to carry it
even further. Stevedores, for example, after indemnifying the shipowner, have attempted to enforce that "hoary" proposition, which is
often stated but rarely applied, that a master is entitled to recover
from his servant when the negligent act of the servant renders the
176
master liable to third persons.

173 Hertel v. American Export Lines, 225 F. Supp. 703 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
174

373 U.S. at 415.

Section 3 of the Act states that compensation is payable "only if the disability
or death results from an injury occurring upon the navigable waters of the United States
... and if recovery ... through workmen's compensation proceedings may not validly be
provided by State law." 44 Stat. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 903 (1958). The recent
case of Atlantic Stevedoring Co. v. O'Keeffe, 220 F. Supp. 881 (S.D. Ga. 1963), illustrates the Act's limitations. A longshoreman working on a dock was caught up by loose
metal banding extending from cargo being hoisted aboard ship by shipboard loading
gear. The longshoreman was dropped between the ship and the dock. There was no
evidence as to whether he hit the ship or the dock, but he was knocked unconscious and
drowned. The court enjoined proceedings under the Longshoreman's Act for lack of
jurisdiction.
176 See Johnson v. Partrederiet Brovigtank, 202 F. Supp. 859 (S.D.N.Y. 1962);
Cavelleri v. Isthmian Lines, 190 F. Supp. 801 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). See generally, Steffen,
The Employees "Indemnity" Action, 25 U. Cm. L. REv. 465 (1958). Compare Horton
v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 326 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1964). A seaman sued the shipowner for unseaworthiness and negligence, alleging that he had been assaulted by a
vicious fellow seaman. The evidence showed that the assailant had previously attacked
another crew member, that he used a broken glass and a bottle on the plaintiff, and that
he bit both of his victims severely. The jury gave the seaman a verdict for $80,000. In
'75
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This "three-cornered Kilkenny Fair" r7 is proving rather expensive
for the stevedore. Judging roughly from the reported cases, the stevedore ends up paying, via the indemnity action, a substantial majority
of the maritime judgments awarded longshoremen. In any event,
whenever the indemnity action does succeed, the stevedore pays, in

addition to his own legal costs and attorney fees, those of the shipowner which are attributable to the defense in the longshoreman's
action.178 In one recent decision, the stevedore was required to in-

demnify the shipowner for costs and attorney fees even though the9
shipowner's defense in the longshoreman's action was successful.-7
And if the longshoreman's recovery from the shipowner does not substantially exceed the benefits he is entitled to under the Longshore-

men's Act, the stevedore in effect absorbs the costs and fees of the longshoreman as well.'8 0 With fees for each attorney running perhaps as
high as thirty to fifty per cent of the longshoreman's recovery,' 8 ' a
net recovery of 25,000 dollars for82the longshoreman may easily cost

the stevedore twice that amount.

a third party action against the assailant, the jury gave the shipowner a verdict for only
$4,300. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the third party action, directing the
trial court to enter a judgment of $80,000 in favor of the shipowner against the assailant.
'L7Strachan Shipping Co. v. Melvin, 327 F.2d 83, 90 (5th Cir. 1964) (dissenting
opinion).
178 Calderone v. Naviera Vacuba S/A, 328 F.2d 578 (2d Cir. 1964); Paliaga v.
Luckenbach S.S. Co., 301 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1962).
170 Strachan Shipping Co. v. Koninklyke Nederlandsche Stoomboot Maalschappy,
N.V., 324 F.2d 746 (5th Cir. 1963), petition for cert. filed, 32 U.S.L. W-M 3281 (U.S.
Feb. 7,
1964) (No. 815).
18 0 In Strachan Shipping Co. v. Melvin, 327 F.2d 83 (5th Cir. 1964), Melvin (a
longshoreman) received $28,000 from his employer in compensation payments. Thereafter, he sued the shipowner for unseaworthiness and recovered $30,000. In a priority
contest between Melvin's employer and Melvin' attorney, the court held that the attorney's 40% contingent fee plus costs (total of $12,500) had first priority. Thus the employer, recouping only $17,500 of this $28,000 in compensation payments, in effect paid
$10,500 of the $12,500 total fees and cost for Melvin's third-party action. The fact that
Melvin sued the third-party after $28,000 in compensation payments had been paid is
immaterial. Whenever the third-party action recovers less than the value of the compensation payments, the employer must pay the difference between (1) the value of
compensation benefits, and (2) the longshoreman's net recovery (i.e., recovery less costs
and attorney fees). See Longshoremen's Act § 33(f), 44 Stat. 1441 (1927), as amended,
33 U.S.C. § 933(f) (Supp. III, 1962); Voris v. Gulf-Tide Stevedores, Inc., 211 F.2d
549 (5th Cir. 1954).
181 See Strachan Shipping Co. v. Melvin, supra note 180 (40% for longshoreman's
attorney); Holley v. The Manfred Stansfield, 186 F. Supp. 805, 809 (E.D. Va. 1960)
(50% for attorney of longshoreman's surviving spouse); Paliaga v. Luckenbach S.S. Co.,
301 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1962) (44% claimed for shipowner's attorney); Calderone v. Naviera Vacuba S/A, 204 F. Supp. 783, 793 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (32% for shipowner's
attorney).
182 In Strachan Shipping Co. v. Melvin, discussed supra note 180, the shipowner
dismissed the indemnity action against the stevedore on the eve of trial. 327 F.2d at 90
n.14. If that action had succeeded, the stevedore's expenses would have included: (1)
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Moreover, as the law stands, there is considerable room for apparent injustice to longshoremen. The courts appear frequently to assume
that a maritime recovery is substantially superior to compensation
under the Act.' 83 If this is in fact true, it must strike longshoremen
who are unable to bring themselves within Sieracki's embrace as rather
arbitrary and unfair. 84 The Yaka decision did not do much to resolve
the disparity if it does in fact exist; it merely moved the line over.
Whatever the inefficiencies and injustices of the present machinery,
they do not appear to be attributable to the Ryan doctrine. If there
is a culprit afloat, it would seem to be the doctrine of unseaworthiness
as applied to longshoremen. In what is perhaps the great majority of
cases where the stevedore is now required to indemnify the shipowner,
the loss should be placed on the stevedore in the first instance, and
rationally, under the Longshoreman's Act.
the principal judgment for Melvin ($30,000), plus (2) the shipowner's costs and attorney
fees (say a conservative 16% % of the principal judgment, i.e., $5,000), plus (3) his own
expenses (say 162 % again, i.e., $5,000), plus (4) compensation benefits ($28,000), for
a total of $68,000. From that, subtract the $17,500 recoupment from the longshoreman's
recovery. That leaves a net expenditure of $51,500-all to give the longshoreman $28,000
which8 3he was entitled to without litigation.
1
What else did the Court have in mind in Reed v. The Yaka, 373 U.S. 410, 415
(1963), when it spoke of the "harsh and incongruous results" that would be reached if
Reed were not allowed a maritime judgment against his employer? See Ryan Stevedoring
Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124, 139-40 (1956) (dissenting opinion). The
superiority of the maritime judgment has been challenged. Shields & Byrne, Application
of the "Unseaworthiness" Doctrine to Longshoremen, 111 U. of PA. L. REv. 1137,
1147-48 (1963).
184 Most of these are cases of dockside injuries which could not be attributed to
the ship, its equipment or its cargo. However, in McKnight v. N. M. Paterson & Sons,
Ltd., 181 F. Supp. 434 (N.D. Ohio 1960), aff'd, 286 F.2d 250 (6th Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 913 (1961), a longshoreman was actually aboard ship in a hold when
he was struck by unloading gear being lowered into the hold by a giant shoreside crane.
The shipowner was granted summary judgment on the longshoreman's unseaworthiness
claim on the ground that the crane, which was owned by the stevedore, was not physically attached to the ship or "adopted" or "integrated" into the ship's equipment, and
thus not within Alaska S.S. Co. v. Petterson, 347 U.S. 396 (1954), and her progeny.

